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Abstract
Does the current development reform agenda, especially the one operationalized by the
World Bank, is Ideological? If so, does it matter? These are the two questions that animate
this article. In answering both questions in the affirmative, the article first demonstrates
how the current development reform agenda is Ideological. It then discusses why and how
it matters that the development reform agenda is Ideological. First, the article argues that
Ideological rendering of the development reform agenda effectively weakens the ability of
Third World countries to articulate their economic and foreign policies in ways that would
benefit their citizenry the most. Second, since the World Bank, as the other international
financial institutions (IFIs) which are the key players in the development reform agenda are
international organizations which are meant to reflect the collective will of their members,
the charge of Ideological bias should be taken more seriously than it has been in the past.
Third, the Ideology of reform and development enables the construction of a discourse
which obfuscates the real causes of poverty and “underdevelopment” and therefore
undermines the efforts to find real solutions to world poverty. Fourth, and related, the
Ideological development discourse thus produced facilitates the building of stable alliances
between national political and economic elites in Third World countries, IFIs, and
multinational corporations. These alliances are sometimes at odds with one another but,
overall, they operate to stabilize the international economic system as presently configured
by containing any major threat of major rapture. These alliances therefore ensure the
continued underdevelopment of the Third World and undermine the very goal of
development for which these IFIs were formed.
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I

Introduction

Is the current international development reform agenda Ideological?1 Does it matter? In
particular, would a confirmation that the development reform agenda is Ideological have any
implications for foreign relations and international affairs? In this article, I answer all these three
questions in the affirmative. I argue that the development reform agenda, especially the one
operationalized by the World Bank, is Ideological, and that the development reform agenda
effectively weakens the ability of Third World countries2 to articulate their foreign policies in
ways that would benefit their citizenry the most more than any other aspect of international law.
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I make some remarks on
terminology and the discourse of development. In Section III, I expound on the meaning and
consequences of calling the development and reform agenda “Ideological.” In Section IV, I
identify the various ways in which the World Bank development agenda is Ideological. I address
the practical repercussions of having an Ideological development agenda in Section V before
concluding in Section VI.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, S.J.D., LL.M, Harvard Law School; LL.B,
University of Nairobi, Kenya. I would like to thank Melda Kamil Ariadno for her indefatigable encouragement for
me to finalize this article.
1

In this article, I use the word “Ideological” with capitalized “I” deliberately. I have explained the meaning of
“Ideology” below. See, infra, notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
2
I use the term “Third World” as an analytical category. This conception of the “Third World” de-emphasizes the
importance of geography and political ideology in the definition of the Third World. In this conception, the Third
World is not a geopolitical construct referring to specific areas of the world that are economically under-developed.
Neither is it an ideological position of non-alignment with either the Western powers or the former communist
powers. It also is not a historical category referring to the post-colonial political period in the non-Western world.
Rather, the analytical category of the Third World emphasizes the power contestation between different holders and
actors and its articulation in international relations. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in
Cultural Geography, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1 (1998-99).
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II

Development Discourse, Development Model and Causation
One direct objective of my study is to examine the claim repeatedly made by the World

Bank that the development policies that it prescribes are based on proven economic ideas that
spur development in a determinate matter.3 Rather, I argue that the policies represent one of the
numerous ways in which economic development could occur. Further, these World Bank
policies are based on many assumptions about human nature and social institutions on the one
hand, and legal and economic institutions on the other, and the way these two sets of institutions
interact.4 Many of these assumptions are based on fundamental misconceptions of both sets of
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In the 1990s, the World Bank’s prescriptive agenda for the developing countries became known as the
“Washington Consensus.” The term was initially coined by John Williamson in 1989, in a conference presentation
at the Institute for International Economics. He used it to refer to 10 policies “almost everyone in Washington”
including the World Bank, IMF, and the US Treasury thought were needed in Latin America: fiscal discipline,
reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalization of interest rates, a competitive exchange rate,
trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property
rights. See John Williamson “Introduction,” in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAPPENED
(John Williamson (ed.), 1 (1990)). Over time, the term “Washington Consensus” came to be identified with the
policies of International Financial Institutions. Joseph Stiglitz, himself a former Chief Economist at the World Bank,
wrote that these policies were derived from “the free market mantra” that gripped Washington in the 1980s: an
extremely limited role for government intervention in the economy of developing nations; rapid privatization of
formerly-owned government industries; liberalization of trade and capital markets. See, Joseph Stiglitz,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 16 (2002). The World Bank has always maintained that it is not
“ideological.” However, there are rare glimpses of the revelation that the World Bank regards some of its work as
ideological. Such glimpses occur mostly when the Bank seeks to shift directions. One such rare moment was in
2004 when the World Bank announced in 2004 that it was replacing the much-maligned Adjustment Lending
Instrument with a new and improved “Development Lending Instrument”, the Vice President and Head of the
Operations Policy and Country Services Network, Mr. James Adams, said the switch to Development Policy
Lending was much more than just a name change:
We have abandoned the prescriptive character of the old policy statement, in which we essentially
enshrined goals and methods: Ithis is how you do public sector reform,’ Ithis is how you privatize…..We
have learned that a wide variety of approaches can work but we’ve also learned that the key ingredients to
successful economic growth include giving greater space to the private sector, and promoting the rule of
law and a functioning judiciary.
http://web.worldbank.org (last visited on April 20, 2006).
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In particular, the World Bank takes the “Market” as either “given or transcendental.” See Warren Samuels,
Markets and Their Social Construction, 71 SOC. RES. 357 (2004). This is implicit in the World Bank’s approach
towards economic policy in developing countries as evidenced by the title to its 2002 World Development Report,
“Building Institutions for Markets.” While the World Bank does not define what it means by “market”, it states that
the report is about “building market institutions that promote growth and reduce poverty.” See World Bank,
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institutions based on oversimplifications of how economic development occurred in Western
liberal democracies.5 To illustrate this point, the basic precept of World Bank development
agenda goes as follows: If at Time 0 (T0) you take a society that has social, economic, and legal
institutions which are inappropriate for economic development, if you introduce the “shock
therapy”6 of “appropriate” formal legal institutions, and control for corruption at Time 1 (T1),
you will generate economic development at the Time 2 (T2).

T0
Social & Cultural Institutions

T1
Formal Legal Institutions

T2
Economic Development

In this sequence, both the social and cultural institutions on the one hand, and the legal
institutions on the other, are determinate phenomena – which accounts for the prediction that
they would interact determinately. Hence, diagrammatically, we can represent this logic as
follows:

WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS, III (2002). This approach
neglects the fact that markets are “created, changed, manipulated, and restructured through the actions of
government, firms, and groups of firms.” Warren Samuels, Id., 364.
5

In particular, the roles of institutions and the government are unrecognized or misrepresented. The perception that
the only institutions that matter are formal legal institutions is misconceived as is the policy debate whether what is
required is “more” or “less” government intervention: the government is omnipresent; the only relevant question is
who would be benefited by a change in regulation. As Clarence Ayres long argued:
The object of dissent is the conception of the market as the guiding mechanism of the economy, or more
broadly, the conception of the economy as organized and guided by the market. It simply is not true that
scarce resources are allocated among alternative uses by the market. The real determinant of whatever
allocation occurs in any society is the organizational structure of that society – in short, its institutions. At
most the market gives effect to prevailing institutions. By focusing attention on the market mechanism,
economists have ignored the real allocation mechanism.
Clarence Ayres, Institutional Economics: Discussion, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 26-27 (1957).
6
Economists, development experts and IFIs often think of the reforms which need to be introduced in the Third
World as a form of “shock therapy.” “Shock Therapy” refers to a set of radical economic reforms aimed at rapid
economic stabilization, liberalization, privatization and the opening of the economy to international trade. “Shock
Therapy” was first used in Bolivia under the advice of Prof. Jeffrey Sachs before it was exported to Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Russia. For a conceptual overview of “Shock Therapy”, see Jeffrey Sachs,
UNDERSTANDING SHOCK THERAPY (1994).
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As Clarence Ayres pointed out long ago, this mode of theorizing ignores all institutions
other than the formal legal institutions.7 The hope is that juxtaposing formal legal institutions
onto social and cultural institutions forces economic actors in a given community to channel their
“political conflict to an economic transaction.”8 In the context of developing countries, it is
hoped that by providing formal legal institutions, the economic actors will begin channeling their
claims over resources using the formal categories provided by these formal legal institutions.
But, of course, providing the formal legal institutions is not a guarantee that the economic actors
will use them as envisaged. In fact, two distinct problems often emerge. In the first place, the
formal legal institutions only become extra chips which the economic actors add to the already
existing array of informal institutions that they could use to press their claims over scarce
resources.9 At best, this means that the formal legal institutions would not have any determinate
outcome because it is not possible to tell a priori which economic actors will choose which
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Clarence Ayres, supra note 5.
Abba Lerner, The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 258 (1971).
9
See, e.g., Joel Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological
Issues Raised by Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467, 512-513 (demonstrating that, at times, economic
actors organize, invent, and mobilize competing norms to frustrate the complete operation of the formal institutions.)
8
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institutions to press their claims and which ones will succeed.10 This problem is exacerbated
rather than remedied by having an independent judiciary. This is because with an independent
judiciary it is difficult for the government to compel economic actors to channel their claims
using the formal legal institutions by ensuring that claims expressed in terms of the formal legal
institutions are given more favorable treatment.11
In the second place, the assumption that social and political conflicts can be neatly
expressed using the formal legal categories provided by the state is problematic for two distinct
reasons. First, some slippage occurs at the level of translation of the conflict from the political to
the economic.12 Second, even the formal legal categories supplied by the state are themselves
manipulable and indeterminate.13 As Duncan Kennedy has argued, the claim is not that the law
is “globally” indeterminate.14 Rather, the claim is that even “clear” formal legal categories leave
sufficient room for legal actors to engage in “strategic behavior” to struggle against the
constraints the legal actors feel arise from the formal legal categories.15 The “strategic behavior”
permit judges [and other legal actors] to “do legal work on the legal materials in pursuance of
strategies that are well understood as ideological projects, and that this work often inflects
outcomes in ways that dispose high ideological stakes.”16
In other words, contrary to the World Bank’s unstated assumptions, there is no necessary
and determinate relationship between formal legal institutions and economic development.
Indeed, both the social-cultural conditions at Time 0 (T0) and the formal legal institutions

10

Id.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Duncan Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIECLE], 1, 279 (1997) (hereinafter “Kennedy,
A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION”).
14
Id.
15
Id., at 279.
16
Id.
11
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introduced at Time 1 (T1) are themselves indeterminate. Hence the correct diagrammatical
rendering of the interactions between the two would most likely look as follows:

Rather than a determinate socio-cultural sphere interacting with determinate formal legal
institutions to produce determinate economic results, messy and contested socio-cultural
practices interact with ideological and manipulable legal institutions to produce an indeterminate
economic reality at the end of the process. But all these seem tautological. Anthropologists, on
the one hand, and institutional economists on the other have made this point before.17 Yet it
appears to be an important aspect of the World Bank’s attitude toward development.
In the next section, I hypothesize that it is important for the World Bank to maintain this
assumption for a variety of reasons. The chief reason is that it gives the World Bank a
determinate discourse in which interventions in the developing world are produced, rationalized,
stabilized, and justified.18 It thus becomes important for the World Bank to insist on the need for
“appropriate” legal institutions which, if introduced in the developing world, would spur

17

See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field As An Appropriate
Subject of Study, LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 719 (1973); Clarence Ayres, supra note 5.
18
See, generally, Arturo Escobar, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
THE THIRD WORLD (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1995) (demonstrating how development discourse and practice
can, through the use of particular categories, become a mechanism of control, influencing both social and economic
realities).
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economic prosperity. It then behooves the World Bank and other international development
agencies (IDAs) to devise projects and programs to install these “appropriate” institutions in the
developing world. This is the Law and Development project; the Development industry: the task
of producing and managing interventions.19 First, the World Bank is Ideological in this
important sense. By maintaining a particular idea about how economic development can or
should be produced with the aid of formal legal institutions, the World Bank necessarily acts to
legitimate a particular type of society.20 This is the classic definition of Ideology. I have
borrowed the “Ideological” with capitalized “I” from Duncan Kennedy to convey the meaning
that the attitudes are a mechanism for legitimating a particular type of society.21 In other words,
the World Bank attitudes toward development seen as a whole are “the product of the underlying
structure of economic forces and relations, which it legitimizes.”22 That “underlying structure”
is the current system of international economic relations including the international division of
labor, extraction of natural resources, banking and trading systems as supposedly supported by a
world of liberal democracies.
However, while I contend that the World Bank is Ideological in its attitudes toward
development, this is not the same as claiming a necessary correlation between the World Bank’s
attitudes toward development and “bad” consequences. It is very difficult, and perhaps futile to
try and prove a causation and effect relationship between the World Bank development projects
and “bad” consequences that flow from them. The reason is that, first, such a causation theory is
too simplistic and second, it may turn out that at times, in fact, some projects do have good
consequences: progressive social change, more growth, more accountability, even redistribution

19

Id.
Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, 291.
21
Id.
22
Id.
20
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of resources.23 An explanation that simply tries to prove “causation and consequences” would
then be blunted by an exposition that demonstrates some “benefits” brought by World Bank
engagement.24 A further danger of such an approach would be to give the implicit impression
that methodologically one can only claim “Ideology” where one can “prove” the case with
detailed data and statistics. The danger here would be that whenever the World Bank (or any
other person or organization) can mathematically prove that a certain project would be
“beneficial” then it should be adopted not withstanding the democratic content of the process
with which this is arrived at.25
Contrary to many critics of the World Bank, I contend that there is no such thing as a
World Bank development “Model.”26 At first blush this may appear contradictory with the claim
that an “Ideology” drives the World Bank development attitudes. However, to claim that there is
an “Ideology” is not to the same as alleging that there is a coherent “Model” that we can identify
23

It is, for example, true that the World Bank has committed massive resources to funding education and the fight
against HIV/AIDS. According to the World Bank, it has committed over US $33 billion in loans and credits to
funding education. It has also committed over $1.6 billion to “fight the spread of HIV/AIDS around the world.”
See, World Bank, 10 Things You Never Knew About the World Bank, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/tenthings/10things2004-english.pdf (last visited on March 14, 2006).
24
For example, in the face of major criticisms about its Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the World Bank
responded by setting up “a separate process to help those who are adversely affected by adjustment. In other words,
the World Bank was willing to let the participation of others, including those affected by the policies, only to reduce
the impact of the adjustment process--but not willing to debate the desirability of the adjustment process itself.
While the World Bank justified its position based on the argument that promoting economic growth is the only way
to achieve significant poverty reduction, it only allowed refutation of its premises as argument for reforming the way
to deal with adjustment--but not as questioning the merits of the adjustment process itself.” Joel Ngugi, Policing
Neo-liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as a Constraining and Enabling Discourse, 26 UNIV. OF PA. J. INT’L &
ECON. L. 568-9 (2005).
25

John Ohnoserge has alluded to this danger in discussing the instrumental way in which the World Bank
understands the concept of the Rule of law. See John K.M. Ohnesorge, “The Rule of Law, Economic Development,
and the Developmental States of Northeast Asia”, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA 91, 112 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003) (arguing that the “Rule of Law” can have different meanings to different
professions and in different parts of the world).This danger is also what has provoked the charge by some World
Bank critics that it promotes “governance by economics.” See, generally, Nicholas Hildyard, THE WORLD BANK
AND THE STATE: A RECIPE FOR CHANGE? (1997).
26
See, e.g., Walden Bello, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
(2005); Walden Bello & Shalmali Guttal, Programmed to Fail: The World Bank Clings to a Bankrupt Development
Model, Multinational Monitor, July/August 2005, available at
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/IMF_WB/WB_ProgrammedToFail.html (last visited on May 8, 2006)
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as a “World Bank Development Model.”27 Indeed, if in fact there was a Model, the task at hand
would be much simpler than it is now. The claim here, therefore, is not that the World Bank
identifies and uses some institutions functionally to achieve previously determined and
articulated purposes according to some clearly discernable unitary “Model” which renders
predictable decisions on particular questions.
The claim is that the process or the discourse through which the World Bank develops
and operates its attitudes toward development are similar to the formation of hegemonies.28 It is
in their conflictual contestation for meanings, the trials and errors, the fits and starts that
eventually shape the very nature or form of intervention that constrains and transforms the
development discourse in a way that makes it more easily apprehendable for political
mobilization – that is for “Ideological” purposes. In other words, the World Bank has not
managed to maintain its influence over the development discourse through a homogenous
“ideology”29 that is unified and easily reducible or discernible as “belonging” to the World Bank.
Rather, the strength draws more from the lack of unity and the diversity of the “Ideology”
(capitalized) coupled with the ability to ‘hang together’ the conflicting elements (the different
27

As Alan Hunt has argued, “ideology is not a unitary entity... Ideologies actually operate in a state of disorder . . .
competing, clashing, affecting, drowning, silencing one another.” Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and
Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 16
(1985) quoting Goran Therborn, THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY (1980).
28

“Hegemony” as a concept was used by Antonio Gramsci to denote the permeation in the society (both within
official government ranks and civil society) an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs or morality which support
the maintenance of the status quo. Such permeation then has the effect of socializing the members of the society the
prevailing circumstances are not the product of historical circumstances but are inevitable, natural and desirable; the
present reality is not a product of historical circumstances but the product of self-evident truths. See, generally,
Antonio Gramsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOK (1971). As Susan Hirsch and Mindie
Lazarus-Black concisely explain: “Hegemony refers to power that ‘naturalizes’ a social order, an institution, or even
an everyday practice so that ‘how things are’ seems inevitable.” Susan Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black,
Introduction/Performance and Paradox: Exploring Law's Role in Hegemony and Resistance, in M. Lazarus-Black &
S. Hirsch, eds., CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE, 7 (1994).
29
Again I borrow “ideology” here with lower-case “i” to refer to what Duncan Kennedy would call a
“universalization project”. In other words, the World Bank does not have one particular “ideology” in this sense –
but many competing ideologies but which can all be comprehended within the superstructure of the “Ideology”. See
Duncan Kennedy, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION.
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“ideologies”). It is this characteristic if the “Ideology” that makes it mobile, more easily
deployable and more effective in interventions.30
In other words, the World Bank does not possess a “Model” which it “consults” and
“squeezes” in moments of need or challenge to throw our consistent arguments and responses to
changing circumstances. Rather, the World Bank has generated a discourse which creates a
general sensibility that drives the field of development: an “Ideology”. It is not a coherent set of
ideas that displaces other ideas in a determinate way. Rather, it is a stable concept which, though
diffuse, even indeterminate, still marks the boundaries of the development process and the
discourse.

II

Positioning World Bank Attitudes Toward Development as a Subject of Critique:
Ideology and the Difficulty of Critique
It is difficult to critique the World Bank attitudes toward development for two related

reasons. First, as I have argued above, there is no “Model” that one can identify as World
Bank’s Model of development. Every time one maps out a typical “Model” for analysis, the
trend changes and the rhetoric, perhaps even part of the substance of the ‘Model’ changes
considerably.31

30

As Kitty Calavita has argued respecting legal Ideology, Ideology “may be powerful precisely because it is replete
with contradictions.” Kitty Calavita, Blue Jeans, Rape and the “De-Constitutive” Power of Law, 35 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 89, 107 (2001).
31
A quick example would be the general rhetoric used to convey the World Bank’s thinking about the role of the
state in development. In the 1996, the World Bank asserted that the state needed to be “minimized” and gave the
standard, formulaic ten point justifications for this “minimization”. The “ten points” I am referring to are what the
inventor of the term “Washington consensus”, John Williamson asserts to be the “convergence” that the world
economists have reached on issues of economic development. See, World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET (2006); John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy
Reform”, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (John Williamson, ed.,
(1990)). However, by 1997, the World Bank was already advocating for an “effective” state. It still used the “ten
points” to reach its conclusions about what the proper role of the state should be. See World Bank, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD (1997). So, the shift from a
“minimized” state to an “effective” one is achieved relying on the same economic justifications, at least at the
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The second reason why it is so difficult to critique the World Bank is due to what I call
only for descriptive purposes “the disappearance of the subject”. While this is connected to the
first reason, it relates more to the act of disappearance within a given specific debate rather than
to the protean nature of the ‘model’ itself. I explain this more concretely below.
The obvious question for us then would be how do we analyze and critique a “Model”
that is not quite a model? How do we concretize it for analysis? And when you do so, what is the
assurance that you would not be engaging in a post-mortem exercise as a result of the expected
shift in the dynamics of the ‘model’? In this section, I am trying to locate the World Bank
attitudes toward development in a ‘position’ that is “critic apprehendable”.
In order to do this, I propose using the concept of “Ideology” with the capitalized “I: as
used by Duncan Kennedy to convey the meaning given to the term by scholars such as Antonio
Gramsci.32 I also propose using the concept of “hegemony” as understood by Antonio
Gramsci.33 Finally I use the concept “ideology” with the lower-case “I” to indicate the meaning
of ideology as understood from the sociology of knowledge point of view especially by Karl
Mannheim.34 In this sense, “ideologies” mean “those complexes of ideas which tend to generate
activities toward maintenance of ideas of the existing order [as well as] those complexes of ideas
which tend to generate activities toward changes of the prevailing order [which Karl Mannheim
calls “utopia”]. 35

rhetorical level. Another less cited example is the shift from the support and financing of Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) in developing countries in the sixties and seventies to the export-oriented growth strategies if
the nineties.
32
Duncan Kennedy, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION.
33
Antonio Gramsci, supra note 28.
34
Karl Mennheim, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE, (Trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, 1989) (hereinafter, “Mannheim, IDEOLOGY AND
UTOPIA”).
35
Id at p. xxi
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Both of these complexes of ideas (those that operate to maintain an existing order and
those that operate to structure change as and when needed) are the stock-in-trade for the
operationalization of the “Ideology”. This is because these complexes of ideas are just one set in
the spectrum of ideas in the society. However, the set of ideas seen as an ideology is made
possible by the fact that the indeterminacy that exists gives the entity making an evaluation some
choice; some discretion. Whether the motive of the person is to maintain the existing order or to
structure an impending change or evolution, the choice made is packaged as “universal” and
“scientific” so that the claim that is applicable across board can be made. In other words, both
discretion and indeterminacy is denied so as to mask the real motive of the person making the
choice – which may be either to maintain an existing order that the person prefers or to change it
in a particular direction. In other words, what enables the Ideology to “reign” is the fact of
manipulable interpretation as a result of indeterminacy. The complexes of ideas are
“ideological” by denying or masking both the motive and the fact that the interpretation
represents only a choice of interpretation.36
This quality of manipulability of the interpretations attributable to different rules and
concepts, and the alternate maintenance and/or change of the existing order based on ideological
stakes in this understanding eventually structures the overall “Ideology” that the World Bank
espouses. This “Ideology”, by contrast to the “ideology” I have been describing above, is the
formal presentation of the world-view that the World Bank prefers – the economic structure itself.

36

This is really not different from what Nobel laureate Douglass North describes as institutional evolution. See,
generally, Douglass North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
(19900. However, to talk of the manipulability of the interpretation is not to say that the motive or material interests
of the interpreter would always correlate determinately with a particular consistent interpretation. This is because
the method/system of interpretation itself acquires a life of its own which mediates the relationship between the
motives and the choice. This aspect of the system acquiring its own autonomous life is what Duncan Kennedy
refers to when he says that: “The rule choices that emerge from the interaction [between legal materials and the
ideological projects] should be understood neither as simply the implications of authority as the implications of the
ideological projects, but as a compromise.” Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, 19.
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As Gramsci would have it: “[Ideology is the terrain] on which men move, acquire consciousness
of their position, struggle.”37
Ideology in this sense functions by being determinate rather than being indeterminate. In
the case of the World Bank, it is a determinate argument about the nature of economics and
economics relations, the nature and economic role of the State, how to dispose questions of
equity and redistribution when they conflict with formal definitions of efficiency, how to
structure worldwide production to increase wealth and so forth. It is the super structure where
the ideologies are produced and diffused. Among its central characteristics is an abiding faith in
neo-classical formulation of the instrumental rationality postulate coupled with a bias toward
erasure or severe limitation of the exceptions of these assumptions at the micro-level. At the
macro-level, the “Ideology” is identifiable by a co-incidence of a rhetorical opposition to ‘big
government’ domestically38 and a commitment to liberalization and privatization internationally
under a supposed “consensus” known as the Washington Consensus.39

37

Gramsci, supra note 28 at 377.
I say that the opposition to “big government” is rhetorical because what the “Ideology” opposes is not really “big
government” but the specific way in which the government chooses to intervene in the economy. Either way, the
government intervenes and the only question to ask is for whose benefit and with what consequences. At this
particular juncture in history, it would appear, the formula that would get the kind of government interventions that
are considered “efficient” is one that emphasizes a cutback on “public” interventions. In the same way, “deregulation” may actually mean “re-regulation”. As John Kay & John Vickers have argued: “[D]eregulation is a
misleading term, because, as often as not, new and generally more explicit regulatory structures are simultaneously
erected in place of what went before.” John Kay & John Vickers, in “Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal” in
DEREGULATION OR REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES,
223 (Giadomenico Majone, ed., (1990)). The main issue is who is privileged by the shift in corporate form and who
benefits from it. Or, as mainstream literature would put it, there has been a growing awareness that de-regulation
“cannot just set rules designed to let competition flourish and then stand back. They also need to be ready to
intervene to keep markets open”. Tony Prosser, “Regulation and Privatized Enterprises: Institutions and
Procedures” in CAPITALISM, CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC REGULATION, 139 (Leigh Hancher, et al, ed.,
(1988)). Hence the framing of the issue as one of more or less government is misleading. Theodore J. Lowi
remarks that:
It should be clear that the issues [which he deals with in the book are remote from the mere question of
more government or less government. We already have more, and twentieth Century [Liberal] democracies
will tolerate nothing less. It is my hope that such a question will be completely discarded…Instead, the
issues will be the still older and almost forgotten ones of what kind of government, what government, what
ends of government, what forms of government, what consequences of government.
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Both the “ideologies” and the “Ideology” are maintained by their combined ability to
elaborate “dominant, residual and emergent cultural practices”-- in other words, by being
hegemonic .40 They carve out a unifying world-view. This common world-view would include
“ideological elements from varying sources, but its unity will stem from its articulating
principle.”41
This follows in the working of Gramsci. In his understanding of hegemony, Gramsci,
critiques both the conventional (modernist) tendency to separate culture from politics and
economics and the Marxist tendency to merely see culture as a “transmission belt” for the
dominant class in any given society.42
Gramsci uses hegemony to examine the precise political, cultural and ideological forms
through which, in any given society, a fundamental class is able to establish its leadership as
distinct from the more coercive forms of dominations such as colonization or imperialism.43
There are diverse ways in which this “leadership” has been established historically. In the next
section, I have outlined how, in addition to relying on the ‘decisive nucleus of economic

Theodore J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM, xvi (1979). We could replace the word “government” in this
quote with “intervention” or “regulation” and leave the rest intact to convey the point here.
39
An easy way to demonstrate that the position of the World Bank is “Ideological” in this sense is to show that the
instrumental rationality postulate has been “refuted” even in the field of economics. Refutation here means that the
assumption has been shown to apply to far fewer situations than the neo-orthodox positions prescribe. A distinct
division of economics, known as the “New Institutional Economics” is precisely built on this refutation. The point,
however, is not that the instrumental rationality postulate has been “proved” to be false – but rather that is has been
so substantially modified by economists. Plausible debates on the exact reach and usefulness of the assumption are
taking place in the field with the result that it is not possible to determine a priori the effect of the assumption in
economic theorizing except by electing to side with one side of the debate. A good example here would be Douglas
North. See, Douglas North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
(1990). In this book, North questions the basic assumptions that human beings are mere economic agents all acting
in a self-interested way and seeking to maximize their wealth and that the market acts in a neutrally consistent way
to equilibrate the actions of these so-called rational actors through the price mechanism. He also explicitly
acknowledges the fact that human action is undersocialized in this mode of economic theorizing.
40
Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms”, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROCESS, 24
(Tony Bennet, et al, eds., (1981)).
41
Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology and in Gramsci,” in Tony Bennet, id. at 231.
42
See especially Gramsci, supra note 28.
43
Id.

15

activity’44, the World Bank has established this “leadership” and hence ensure domination of
ideas.
It bears repeating two things. First, the domination of ideas takes place irrespective of
the value of the content of these ideas though the dominance is often, justified or explained in
terms of the inherent truth or value of the ideas themselves. Second, to point out this “dominant”
idea is not the same as claiming the existence of an essentialist, singularly coherent idea or set of
ideas to which the World Bank invariably returns to support their programs. Rather, it is to reregister the claim already made that there is a general sensibility that is loosely discernable that
drives the development discourse.
However, it is a mistake also to assume that this looseness renders the attitudes of the
World Bank so diffuse that the “Ideology” becomes definitionally and tangibly inoperable hence
necessitating an utterly contextual contestation in each specific case. Indeed, it is through the
creation of this delusion of “diffusion” that the “Ideology” entrenches itself by defying
recognition as such. As Kerry Rittich points out:
However, because it is an inherently open concept, the actual content of best practice [the
diffusion of World Bank attitudes undergirded by a stable sensibility] and the policy
proposals now in vogue could undergo dramatic change, even reversal, without
disrupting the idea of submission and conformity to a dominant model……The fact that
[it] defies any stable definition may be precisely the property which enables it to survive
as a discourse and structure of analysis.45
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Id.
Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the Legal Structures of Market Reform,
183 (1998) (Unpublished SJD dissertation, Harvard Law School).
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The current intellectual fashion within the World Bank and among its protagonists is to
deny that neo-liberalism is synonymous with the “Washington Consensus.”46 They argue that
critics have fundamentally misunderstood and mischaracterized the Washington Consensus by
calling it an “Ideology.”47 The ability of the World Bank to respond to claims that it is
“Ideological” comes in part because it is able to point to the conflicts that characterize its
attitudes as “proof” that its discourse is not ideological. It turns out however that the
inconsistencies are actually part of the stock-in-trade that debilitates criticism by decentering its
“systemism” hence masking its hegemonic traits. The tendency to be conflictual therefore turns
out to be a strength rather than a weakness.
However, since despite the conflictual nature of the discourse it maintains its own
stability, the World Bank is still able to point to its internal incoherence as a response to the
claim that it is “Ideological”. In doing this, the World Bank implicitly links “Ideology” with
coherent structures and internal harmony of arguments. Thus the World Bank misrepresents the
nature of “Ideology” and its ability to withstand incoherence. In fact, internal incoherence and
fluidity is the predisposing factor for the prosperity of the Ideology.

IV

The Vehicles and Methods of World Bank’s Development Ideology
So far, we have already seen two ways in which the World Bank attitudes toward

development are Ideological. First, we have seen how the manipulability of interpretation
creates indeterminacy that gives choice that is, however, packaged as universal and scientific.
The choice is however based on motive. Second, along with this packaging of a choice based on
motive as universal and scientific, the World Bank also engages in a discourse aimed at denying
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See, for example, John Williamson, supra note 31.
Id.
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the indeterminacy. This is the development discourse. This process of ‘naturalizing’ or
universalizing the preferred policy choices is Ideological in the sense that it masks the motive
behind the policy choices themselves.
But how can one explain the success of the World Bank’s attitudes toward development
in becoming so dominant? I will here briefly propose seven ways in which the World Bank has
responded to its critics and thereby ensured the continued dominance of the attitudes toward
development that it prefers.
One way that the World Bank responds to claims that it is Ideological is by simply
pointing to its own incoherence as an ostensible categorical impeachment of the charge that it is
Ideological.48 By correctly denying the existence of a ‘Model’ in the sense of coherent structures
with unified and internal harmony, the World Bank hopes that it also disproves the claim that it
is Ideological. To still show that it is Ideological, I propose to restore the meaning of Ideology
that does not insist on formal structures or false consciousness as a necessary characteristic of
Ideology.49 Rather, we should understand Ideology as competing and conflicting discourses
taking place to define a stable boundary. If we do this, then the “proof” that the World Bank
discourse is in fact internally incoherent would strengthen rather than weaken the claim that it is
Ideological.50 Hence the meaning of Ideology that I am using is one that divorces itself from
understanding Ideology exclusively as a false consciousness.51

48

Id.
See supra notes 19-22, and accompanying text.
50
Kerry Rittich uses the concept of “best practice” to explain this point:
“In a sense, best practice is neoliberalism. Best practice may encompass everything from specific policy
recommendations based on detailed empirical analysis to broad generalities and received conventional
wisdom about the attributes and requirements of a market economy. This quality permits best practice to
function as the meta concept, linking together disparate arguments and positions which might seem
otherwise only contingently related or, on their own, indeterminate or at least unpersuasive.”
Kerry Rittich, supra note 45, at 175-176.
51
“False consciousness” in the Marxist mode is the idea that material and institutional processes mislead
participants in an economic system to misperceive their real interests so that it interferes with the ability of the
49
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Second, the World Bank claims that the attitudes that it espouses toward development are
“true” because they are universal. That explains, the claim goes, why they are dominant. The
Washington Consensus is really “universal” convergence that deserves to “be endorsed across
the political spectrum” because it represents, not just one point of view, but the truth.52 The
World Bank generally implies that the superiority of its development attitudes over rival other
development agenda is self-evident.53 The rival ideas on development have been “proved” not to
work – and “jettisoning of the Marxist baggage that the left has been saddled with for the last
140 years or so should enhance the prospects of the left….”54
In this mode of argument, the World Bank conflates the content/value of its attitudes
toward development with their dominance. The superiority of the attitudes is explained in terms
of their dominance while their dominance is explained in terms of their superiority. Hence, the
World Bank has stated that: “Although the recipe for good policies is well known, too many
countries still fail to take it to heart.”55 This statement apparently comes as a justification for an
earlier one in the same report that: “[It is] generally recognized that the market was the best
instrument for realizing growth and improving welfare.”56

members of an oppressed group or class from perceiving the real cause of their oppression. In this mode, Marxists
would define Ideology as synonymous with “false consciousness.” Engels wrote:
“Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously indeed but with a false
consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an
ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought
he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or his predecessors.”
K. Marx and F. Engels, Engels to Mehring, in SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF MARX AND ENGELS, 511
(1942).
52
John Williamson, Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’, in 21 WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 1329-1336,
reprinted in Stuart Corbridge, DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 587 (Vol.
I, 1999).
53
Nicholas Hildyard, THE WORLD BANK AND THE STATE: A RECIPE FOR CHANGE? 41 (1997). In its
publications and reports, the World Bank equates “good policies” with the Washington Consensus and implies that
the only disagreement is on the implementation of the Consensus.”
54
John Williamson supra note 31 at 592.
55
World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD, 147 (1997).
56
Id., at 31.
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This conflation of the truth/value/content debate with the dominance of ideas makes it
extremely difficult for alternative viewpoints to be raised to challenge the World Bank attitudes.
This is because of the fact that the discourse is structured cyclically. If one addresses their
criticism to the value/content of the Ideology, then the World Bank uses the dominance or
prevalence of the attitudes as a response, and vice versa. A criticism directed at the prevalence
of the attitudes invites a response based on the alleged truth/content of the attitudes themselves.
Beyond these, the third, fourth and fifth reasons why the World Bank has been so
successful in operationalizing its Ideology are related. The third is simply the sheer resources
that are used to maintain the orthodox World Bank attitudes toward development. These
resources are employed in a variety of ways to entrench World Bank’s attitudes toward
development. One obvious way is its own financial power as the foremost international
development agency with an administrative budget of $2,011.3 million during last year’s fiscal
year.57 The World Bank also spends US $15-$20 billion in loans for various projects.58 This
gives it a ready visibility which is magnified by coordinating and subordinating many other
international financial and technical organizations, bilateral aid agencies, and export credit
institutions.59 As Cheryl Payer reports:
Financially, the World Bank puts great emphasis on ‘co-financing’. It persuades other
(and potentially rival) funding agencies to contribute their capital to projects that have
been prepared and appraised by the Bank for its own funding…….[They all] frequently
invest or contribute money to projects selected, defined, appraised, supervised by the
World Bank. Even the International Fund for Agricultural Development, which began
57

World Bank, The World Bank Annual Report 2005: Year in Review, available at http://web.worldbank.org (last
visited on March 16, 2006).
58 World Bank, Project Cycle: Overview, available at http://web.worldbank.org (last visited on May 8, 2006).
59 See, generally, Cheryl Payer, THE WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982).
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operations in 1978 and was intended specifically as a rival lending institution controlled
by developing country members, has signed a cooperation agreement with the Bank and
has contributed its funds to several Bank projects.60

Fourth, the World Bank also requires borrowing governments to contribute funds to Bank
projects “usually in the form of infrastructure or operating expenses necessary for the success of
the project.”61 This technique of “matching” funds no doubt induces the government to spend
money and other resources for funding purposes determined by the Bank. It thus ensures that
governments acquire “ownership” interests in World Bank-funded projects, hence disabling them
from criticizing such projects in the future.
The fifth way that the World Bank uses its vast resources to facilitate the success of its
ideology is by churning out literature that almost literally silences alternative viewpoints. The
Bank employs more than 800 professional economists with an annual research budget of about
$25 million.62 The influence that his has in the development field cannot be slighted. Two
studies devoted to it effects have come to almost similar conclusions. Mahbub Ul Haq remarked:
This whole desire to build a research empire here, to duplicate a Harvard or a Yale, to try
to do better than they do, and publish, has been very counterproductive. There is a lot

60 Id. at 52.
61 Id. at 18.
62 Nicholas Stern & Francisco Ferreira, “The World Bank as ‘Intellectual Actor,’” in THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF
CENTURY, 524 (Devesh Kapur, et al, eds., Vol. II, (1997)).
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more of an argument to have indigenous research because it would be more suited to the
cultural and other peculiarities of each nation.63
While Nicholas Stern wrote, succinctly summarizing our three points above:
The Size of the Bank’s lending program (of the order of $15 billion to $20 billion a year)
allows it to exert considerable influence on the thinking and policies of borrowing
countries. The weight of the number of development economists, the research budget
and the leverage from its lending means that the Bank’s potential influence is profound,
and it cannot be seen as just one of a number of fairly equal actors in the world of
development economics.64
In short, the vast resources that the World Bank has at its disposal skew the development
discourse in its favor. Its role as a producer and disseminator of knowledge influences the
acceptance of its attitudes toward development.
The penultimate way to explain World Bank’s success in pushing forward its attitudes
toward development is what I call justificatory oscillationism. To maintain the link between the
truth/content of is attitudes toward development and the dominance of the attitudes, the Bank
characteristically resorts to three arguments: the Hayekean liberalism argument, the efficiency
argument and the economic empiricism argument.65
In every project, literal or literary, the World Bank oscillates between these three
justifications for its attitudes toward development shifting between and among them in a manner

63 Mahbub Ul Haq, WORLD BANK ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, quoted in 'The World Bank and the State, a Recipe for
Change?', Bretton Woods Project, 1998.
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Nicholas Stern & Francisco Ferreira, “The World Bank as ‘Intellectual Actor,’” in THE WORLD BANK: ITS
FIRST HALF CENTURY, 524 (Devesh Kapur, et al, eds., Vol. II, (1997)).
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I have distilled these three arguments from the work of Kerry Rittich. See Kerry Rittich, supra note 45. The
coinage of the terms as used here is actually Duncan Kennedy’s characterization of the arguments raised by Kerry
Rittich in a personal conversation.
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that makes it difficult for critics to conceptually respond without getting caught in the
justificatory oscillation. The foundational argument is usually styled in terms of the rational
basis for the emergence of certain institutions which “have been proved to work.”66 This then
lays down the case for transplanting these institutions to those areas of the world that desire
development. This is what I call the Hayekean Liberalism justification.67 It has its roots in
Darwinian theory of evolution: beliefs about the necessity of intense competition and the moral
necessity of market forces in the economy.
The implicit argument is that the market as a form of social organization is a socially
neutral institution.68 Hence it is readily transferable. The mechanism through which this transfer
takes place is by usage of legal institutions. Hence the World Bank attitudes toward
development are characterized by invocations about certain formal institutional prerequisites is
based on the evolution-toward-efficiency paradigm.69 This paradigm casts the institutions
obtaining in the industrialized (developed) economies as efficient by virtue of their having
facilitated the development of these regions and thus prescribes the establishment of these
institutions in the developing regions of the world. However, this paradigm has recently
66

From 1996, the World Bank’s mantra has been the neo-classical message that “markets work.” Hence, the World
Bank’s development agenda in the developing countries has been about transforming “planned” economies into
“market” economies. One can discern this clear patter by looking at some of the sub-titles of the World Bank’s
annual flagship publication, the World Development Report -- in 1996: From Plan to Market; and in 2002: Building
Institutions for Markets. In this regard, the World Bank merely represents the general neo-classical view which may
be summarized as saying that market failures are better than government failures. As Richard Posner has stated:
“We have reason to believe that markets work - that capitalism delivers the goods, if not the Good -- and it would be
a mistake to allow philosophy to deflect us from the implications, just as it would be a mistake to allow philosophy
to alter our views of infanticide ... The mounting evidence that capitalism is more efficient than socialism gives us
an additional reason for believing economic theory.” Richard Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE,
384 (1990).
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increasingly been impugned not only in the biological evolutionary field from where it was
plucked but also by mainstream law and economics scholars who have used it indiscriminately in
the past to explain the rise of the West.70
The broader arguments in support of the attitudes are suggestive. It is common and
predictable to explain underdevelopment in the developing regions of the world by blaming
excessive government intervention and interference in economic activities.71 This, it is explained,
leads to a distortion of the price mechanism thus inducing inefficient allocation of resources and
ultimately leads to market and growth failures.72 The remedy then suggested is the familiar one:
Free the market forces by creating and strengthening the institutions that support the market and
pull the state out of economic activities. In other words, export the market institution to the
transition economies, plant it there and let the free exchange that it will induce do everything else.
Hayek’s name in this mode of justification conveys the sense and logic popularized by Hayek
that the regulations “needed to ensure the proper functioning of markets……..should be agreed
internationally and be enforceable through international law, since national legislations
invariably leads to protection and trade barriers.”73
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For example, in corporate law, Mark Roe and others have persuasively shown that evolution-toward-efficiency
does not adequately explain the survival of legal and economic institutions. Mark Roe has observed:
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This line of argument ties in with the second justification that the World Bank
characteristically resorts to in support of its attitudes toward development. This is the allocative
efficiency argument. By use of the mathematically proven rules of general equilibrium,
Walrasian identity of market and the ability of an open and competitive economy to operate at a
Pareto optimum, it is often theoretically shown that these economies could automatically build
stable markets which would then allocate resources efficiently and put the economy at the
operational path on the utilities possibilities frontier. The market is thus prescribed as the cure to
all economic ailments. It is this thinking that has characterized World Bank policies in
formulating Structural Adjustment Programs.
Even while this may be an oversimplification of the policies, it captures the main spirit
and philosophy. In spite of its mathematical elegance, it readily suggests three difficulties. First,
it is based on the implicit assumption for long shared both by the Marxists and Modern economic
theorists of the West that the predominantly agrarian societies in the developing world are
essentially different from the industrialized societies in two major respects. One they are not
market-oriented (the Marxists would even go further and say that, indeed, they are anti-markets).
Two the agrarian mode of production, being the same as the mode of consumption, differs
greatly from that obtaining in the industrialized economies and that this means that the agrarian
societies do not or cannot adequately respond to economic pressures in a rational way. In other
words, the mode of production of the farm differs substantially from the mode of production of
the firm.74
The second difficulty is that the World Bank development attitudes take the kind of
market that it prescribes as a socially-neutral institution. This is implicitly based on the
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assumption that the market functions well when there is a generalized impersonal exchange by
atomized individuals in the society. In other words it is assumed that it is desirable to tear the
individual from the social context for the market to perform well. It is further assumed that
markets in the industrialized economies have actually achieved this: freeing the individual from
societal context, relations, solidarity and the domination effect that is generated in a
hierarchically ordered society.75 This way, only the price mediates relations between actors in the
market.
Third, and related to the second, the model equates the formation of a market to the
imposition of a formal set of rules which would overnight transform transition economies into
productive ones. In other words it assumes that the only institutions that are necessary for the
establishment of a stable market are formal rules. The attitudes therefore follows in the tradition
of the dominant neo-classical theorizing in which the individual is thoroughly undersocialized
and ignores the fact that transaction take place and the actions of individuals are embedded in
concrete, on-going system of social relations.76 The formation of an anonymous market by use
of formal rules would only solve half the problem if at all.
In tandem with this dominant attitudes toward development policies is the continual
identification (bolder and more explicit in the post-cold war period) of the economic policy that
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is fashioned as “appropriate” with a certain form of organization of world affairs and national
economies. With these are crafted various concepts that are readily reconstructed in
contemporary malleable and pragmatic international law to enter its vocabulary with much ease.
This in part explains the renewed invocations of concepts such as the rule of law, human rights
and good governance – all with a distinct economic hue lately imbued.
The third justification that the World Bank resorts to is the economic empiricism
justification. The argument simply goes that the attitudes and policies that the World Bank
espouses have been deemed to work in specific cited examples and that this made a strong case
for their application. As Kerry Rittch observes:
Assertions about best practices ostensibly rest on an empirical base. An important, if not
definitional, aspect of best practice is establishing the role that particular types of
investments or institutional factors play in economic growth.77
In this mode, the justification neither relies on the “efficiency” of the attitudes themselves nor the
argument that the attitudes require the prescription of particular time-honored “liberal”
institutions that are traditionally associated with democracy and economic growth. Rather, the
argument is simply that the attitudes are superior because they work.
This is, of course, a slippery slope. Basing economic prescriptions on empirical evidence
requires consistent results from the studies undertaken in the field. But these are not always
forthcoming. A famous example of conflicting empirical evidence included the successes of the
Newly Industrializing Countries despite following paths different from that typically advanced
by the World Bank.78 A less famous example of contrary evidence is the land titling program in
Kenya. Generally empirical evidence has at best been moot as to whether formal registration of
77
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titles with respect to land actually enhances security in land ownership and further, whether such
registration and titling has any significant causal relationship with investment and land
productivity.79
However, the empiricism component of the three justifications is extremely important. In
a sense, it functions like the rational choice model in economic theorizing – and, in fact, the
World Bank conflates the two. As Milton Friedman long stated in his famous defense of the
rational choice model, the assumptions do not have to be realistic.80 All that is required is that
the predictions that flow from those assumptions be affirmed by confrontation with evidence.81
Like the empiricism component in the World Bank thinking about development, the
rational choice theory involves suspending complex social and political complexities and
drawing economic conclusions in a situation that has been produced by an interaction of all three.
However, every time you critique the essentialism of reification, you are likely to get the
response that rational choice theory reduces the complexities for the sake of making abstractions
that are necessary for the constructing models which can then be tested empirically. So, if you
proved that in one specific case the model does not match the reality, the response would be that
such an example does not necessarily repudiate the model. In any event, given what is included
or excluded in compiling the results, it becomes impossible to come up with ‘scientific’ results.
When the results are moot, it is resort to the other two justifications that does the rest of the work.
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V

The Effects of Ideology in the Development Field
The Bank is an international organization formed to “assist in the reconstruction and

development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive
purposes.”82 From the outset, “events bumped the Bank aside from the first of its two mandates
(“reconstruction”) and prompted a determined commitment to development.”83 This was
because the US chose to finance the bulk of reconstruction efforts in Europe bilaterally through
the European Recovery Program (or Marshall Program) rather than through the Bank.84 The
Bank has been touted as a “prototypical operational organization.”85 This refers to what is
considered one of the primary functions of international organizations: to centralize
administration for purposes of efficiently managing collective activities.86 The Bank is seen as a
latter-day epitomization of the “functional” role of international organizations. In this mode
international organizations are technical bodies with very specific non-political mandates aimed
at addressing technical problems requiring international cooperation for solution.87 These
follows in the tradition of states coordinating actions in the socio-economic areas of life made
necessary by the internationalization of economic life.88 These functional needs of states to
share information and technical expertise had led to the formation of the earliest international
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organizations like the International Telegraphic Union (ITU); the Universal Postal Union (UPU);
the International Bureau of Weights and Measures; the Metric Union; and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO). Since such cooperation involves non-political matters,
internal sovereignty of the cooperating states is not implicated.
This was clearly the animating philosophy of the Bretton Woods Institutions – including
the Bank. Hence, one may say that the “Prime Directive”89 of the Bank is spelled out in Article
IV(10) of its Articles of Agreement. It provides:
The Bank and its offers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in
Article I.90
This functional vision of international organizations is in line with the dominant view in
the post-war period whereby international organizations are viewed as functional responses “to
the complexities of the modern state system rather than an optional experiment fastened upon
it.”91 Consequently, through the first three decades of its existence, the World Bank read its
Articles of Agreement as forbidding the use of economic Ideology as a reason to refuse lending.
During this time, the Bank fastidiously eschewed explicitly espousing any economic Ideology –
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even though one could make the argument that the Bank’s policies and lending criteria were
driven by a loosely “market ideology.”92
While it is contested whether this functional prohibition of engagement in the political
affairs of states is pragmatically possible, this principle was the foundation of the Bank’s lending
criterion and policies through its first three decades.93 During this time, both the Bank and the
IMF read their founding charters narrowly to oust any discretion on their part to make political
considerations in their operations.94 One may therefore argue that during these early years, at the
very least, the political considerations prohibition served as a constraint on the ability of the
Bank to act Ideologically. Indeed, until 1980, the most “explicit statement on the virtues of the
market mechanism espoused by the Bank in its early years [was] found in the Report on Cuba
[that]: ‘For, to date, none of man’s efforts to repeal the law of supply and demand have been
successful.’ The report was intended to reflect the views of the [Bank Mission to Cuba], which
were not necessarily identical to those of the Bank; but the letter from the President of the Bank
to the President of Cuba which accompanied the report in effect endorsed the Mission’s
recommendation and came very close to identifying the Bank with the Mission’s views.”95
To understand how far we have come from the constraints placed by the political affairs
prohibition in the early years of the Bank and now, consider the following paragraph from the
Bank’s flagship publication, the World Development Report of 1996:
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It is a hard fact of transition that the features of a market economy that many of these
countries need most are the very ones that will take the longest to build….moving from
Plan to Market requires a new way of thinking about the entire legal system.96
By the mid-nineties, the World Bank had completed the task of re-reading its mandate to include
a “restrictive” incorporation of “political” considerations within the borrower countries as long
as those considerations are pre-requisites for the creation of an enabling environment for
economic development.97
How did this happen? How did the Bank transform a rule against explicit consideration
of the Ideological orientation of a state in lending decisions to become a rule requiring such an
explicit consideration as a goal of development? The answer is supplied by the concept of
“Good Governance.” As James Gathii has ably traced the origin of the Bank’s use of the concept,
with time, the Bank sought to explain failure of development in terms of the adverse effects of
governmental intervention in the economy.98 Since such adverse effects directly contribute to
the construction of the environment in which development occurs, “Good Governance” defined
in terms of institutions that establish predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced rules for
investors became an important economic consideration in the Bank’s activities and policies.99
The result was that any concept which vaguely implicated the construction of an “enabling”
environment for economic development to take place could potentially become an “economic
consideration.”100 However, whether particular activities or concepts in fact become
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incorporated in the “Good Governance” agenda depends on the utility of those concepts to the
Bank’s programs.
This nebulous interpretation of the non-political mandate of the Bank is therefore
problematic not just because it is potentially over-broad, it is also plastic enough that it can be
and has been used selectively by the Bank. This allows the Bank to insert Ideology in its lending
activities at two different stages. First, the Bank introduces Ideology in the broadening of the
potential meaning of “non-political mandate”, and then rendering only selective aspects of those
social, cultural, and political activities that the Bank considers important for the promotion of its
economic programs as the “economic considerations” which the Bank is authorized to take into
account. As James Gathii has argued:
[The] political conditionality or good governance primarily leaves the economic
programs promoted by these institutions intact. The project cycle is simply the process of
giving practical effect to these pre-conceptualized programs of the IFIs [International
Financial Institutions]. It consists mostly of the process of disbursement of loan funds
from “project identification to preparation, appraisal, negotiation, implementation and
supervision and finally evaluation. In addition, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and
the World Bank limit the scope of political conditionality to only those considerations
that affect the economic factors which justify loan disbursement. Political conditionality,
therefore, focuses on the behavior of the borrowing state and primarily leaves the
economic programs promoted by these institutions intact. (internal quotations omitted)101
Second, as I argued above, it also turns out that the economic programs of these
institutions were themselves crafted Ideologically: presented as though they are based on
universal truths while, in fact, they represent only one approach to economic development.
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Hence, in the end, the Bank ends up impermissibly entrenching Ideology in its lending programs.
From the point of view of international law, this is problematic for at least four reasons. One, the
development discourse as driven by the World Bank undermines the possibility of achieving
economic development. This is because, as I have demonstrated above, the Bank policies are
often founded on a misguided view of how formal legal institutions interact with other
institutions to impact economic activities in a given country, region, or even the village. Two,
the current discourse undermines the fundamental architecture of international law. One of the
key organizing principles that emerged in the post-war public international law is the principle of
non-intervention in the affairs of states. This core principle is enshrined in Article 2 of the UN
Charter102 and is reflected in Article IV(10) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreements. As many
commentators have pointed out, the drafters of the UN Charter were keen to maintain the legal
notion of “domestic jurisdiction” as an important limitation on the powers of the UN and the
reach of international law generally.103 This is because, the post-war international legal
architecture was based on the idea that the best way to preserve peace, security, and human rights
was to protect each state from suffering limitations with regard to issues that were best left to the
citizens of each state. This view, reflected in post-war international legal policy, was then that
states should not suffer limitations with regard to “the treatment of [their] own citizens, or
regarding [their] own organization of government, or, lastly, in activities concerning the use of
[their] own territory.”104 This core principle that peace, human rights, and development are best
achieved when each state has the right to determine its own policies subject, of course, to the
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outer limits set by the state’s international obligations is undermined by the Bank’s over-broad
interpretation of Article IV(10) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreements to permit it to consider a
state’s Ideological orientation before extending economic assistance.
Moreover, the broadening of the Bank’s mandate to include political considerations has
the further impact of undermining democracy. This is because the Bank’s broadened mandate
disables political majorities in developing countries from choosing their own economic
philosophies. This occurs because the Bank has used its broadened mandate to design political
conditionalities whose effect is to cushion fundamental political questions from political debate
by including them in the concept of “economic considerations” and hence subject to the Bank’s
review powers in making lending decisions. If a state’s economic orientation, social, and
political policies can all be taken into account in determining whether the Bank would extend
help to a given state, it follows that the Bank can dictate these policies for the states. In the end,
these “economic considerations” simply become the tool which the Bank uses to legitimate “he
introduction and continuation of a set of economic reform policies enacted by surprise and
independently of public opinion and of representative organizations and institutions.”105 It
hardly bears concluding that a state which is hardly capable of marshalling its own democratic
processes to determine its own social, political and economic policies, is not capable of spelling
out its own foreign policies in the best interests of its citizens. The broadening of the Bank’s
mandate, therefore, has been a very effective tool in subverting the principle of equal sovereignty
which is at the core of contemporary international legal architecture. Since it is the developing
countries that are least developed which most need the Bank’s economic assistance, it follows
that the Bank has the biggest leverage in influencing the domestic policies of these countries.
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VI

Conclusion
Does it matter that the international development discourse as operationalized by the

World Bank is Ideological? There are many reasons why it matters. First, if in fact, as I suggest,
the outcome of the Ideological rendering of the development reform agenda is to effete the
ability of Third World countries to attain the best interests of their citizens, then it needs to be
reformed to the extent that it harms these citizens. Second, since the World Bank, as the other
international financial institutions (IFIs) which are the key players in the development reform
agenda are international organizations which are meant to reflect the collective will of their
members, the charge of Ideological bias should be taken more seriously than it has been in the
past. Third, the Ideology of reform and development enables the construction of a discourse
which obfuscates the real causes of poverty and “underdevelopment” and therefore undermines
the efforts to find real solutions to world poverty. Fourth, and related, the Ideological
development discourse thus produced facilitates the building of stable alliances between national
political and economic elites in Third World countries, IFIs, and multinational corporations.
These alliances are sometimes at odds with one another but, overall, they operate to stabilize the
international economic system as presently configured by containing any major threat of major
rapture. These alliances therefore ensure the continued underdevelopment of the Third World
and undermine the very goal of development for which these IFIs were formed.
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